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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
oOo
Case No. 930550-CA

ALICIA LARSON
Plaintiff/Appellant,
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Priority 4
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REPLY TO BRIEF OF APPELLEE

REPLY TO STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellee's (Marc's) Statement of Facts asserts that the
child custody evaluator expressed some concerns about the fact that
Alicia was living with her fiancee, Mr. Pomeroy.
Brief at p. 8-9).

(Respondent's

This statement inappropriately implies that

Alicia was either living with or planning to live with Mr. Pomeroy
without benefit of marriage.

It improperly suggests a deficiency

in her moral standards with regard to the issue of child custody.
The

child

custody

evaluator

noted

that Alicia

was

planning on living with Doug Pomeroy, as would be expected on her

marriage.

(T. 137). He recommended that Alicia's move to Oregon

to live with Mr. Pomeroy and the children conditioned on marriage*
(Trial Exhibit 6 at p. 18). There was no evidence at trial that
Alicia was living with Mr. Pomeroy or planned to do so with the
parties' minor children without benefit of marriage.
ARGUMENT
Point I
ALICIA HAS MARSHALLED THE EVIDENCE AND
SUFFICIENTLY DEMONSTRATED THAT THE TRIAL
COURT'S FINDINGS WERE EITHER INADEQUATE OR SO
LACKING IN SUPPORT AND AGAINST THE CLEAR
WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE SO AS TO CONSTITUTE AN
ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN THE COURT'S DECISION TO
AUTOMATICALLY TRANSFER PHYSICAL CUSTODY OF THE
CHILDREN TO MARC IF ALICIA MOVED FROM SUMMIT
COUNTY. UTAH.
To successfully challenge the trial court's ruling,
Alicia is required to demonstrate that the Findings are inadequate
to support the court's ruling or the evidence so lacking in support
of the findings that they are clearly erroneous and that the trial
court's ruling thereon is therefore an abuse of discretion. Barnes
v. Barnes. 857 P.2d 257 (Utah App. 1993); Crouse v. Crouse. 817
P.2d 836 (Utah App. 1991).

Alicia has so marshalled the evidence.

Although Marc contends that the findings are supported by
the evidence and not against the clear weight of the evidence, he
fails to demonstrate that the evidence and findings properly
support the court's automatic transfer of physical custody of the
children to him should Alicia move from Summit County, Utah.
Neither the findings nor the evidence support the trail court's

2

order modifying child custody provisions of the parties' Decree of
Divorce.
Marc claims that the evidence amply supports the court's
finding that:
While the mother has been the primary
caretaker, which I find is true, the children
are nearly equally bonded to both parents.
The father has a significant, active, open
involvement in the lives of the children...
The children have, during what I might call
the tender years, been primarily in the care
of their mother.
Naturally, they would be
expected to be very close to their father, but
in this case we have a uniquely interested
father.
We have someone who is extremely
committed
to
these
children,
who
has
previously encountered the experienced of
being separated from children of a prior
marriage, and whose wife of the former
marriage has even stated that he has gone to
extraordinary steps to maintain a healthy
relationship with those children. (T. 33).
He

acknowledges

that the

evidence

children are more closely bonded to Alicia.

demonstrates

the

Although he argues

that the child custody evaluator was ambivalent about choosing the
best placement for the children, that same evaluator recommended
the children continue in the primary care of Alicia if she was to
move from Utah and that it would be extremely disruptive to them if
the children were to be separated from their mother.

(T. 143).

The evaluator was ambivalent about whether or not Alicia
should stay in Utah to enable Marc's weekly visits with the
children, but felt it was in the best interests of the children for
them to continue living with Alicia as primary caretaker.

3

Mr.

Peterson recognized advantages in the prospective move the Oregon.
(T. 128).
Marc also asserts that the evidence supports the court's
finding that he is a committed father, because he was committed to
his children by a prior marriage.

Although Marc is a good father

to the parties' children, the Court failed to refer to any
pertinent

factors

demonstrating

its

finding

that

Marc

was

"extremely committed to these children" or any of his attributes
supporting such a finding with regard to the parties' children; he
wanted to be involved in their lives, but there was no evidence
demonstrating that he had the time to care for them and meet their
daily needs as Alicia has always done.

The evidence showed that

Marc visited with the parties' children approximately two and onehalf weekends per month (T. 91), that he had always kept long work
hours from approximately 7:00 a.m. or earlier until 7:00 p.m. or
later during weekends and on Saturday mornings each week (T. 10,
29) and that he would have to hire a nanny to care for the children
if

they

were

to

live

with

him

(T.

39-40).

Under

these

circumstances, the strong relationship the children continue to
have with Marc demonstrates that Alicia has lived up to her
responsibilities as the primary caretaker of the children, and is
supporting the children's relationship with Marc.

It is not a

factor to support a change of physical custody. See e.g. Crouse v.
Crouse, 817 P.2d 836 (Utah App. 1991).
To deduce that this bonding is a result of Marc's
involvement during the short hours he is with the children is to
4

negate the value

and

impact

of the

constant

care, and the

importance of that care, that their mother has always giving the
children.

Other than Marc's promises of working less to be with

the children, there was no evidence based upon his past conduct to
suggest that he was committed to meeting the children's needs on a
daily basis. He testified that he would limit his work hours if he
were physical custodian of the children because he has arrived at
a position in his therapy practice where he could reduce his hours
(T. 11), but he had not done so.
Marc also contends that there is sufficient evidence
supporting the finding of the Court that:
It is speculative whether a move to Corvallis,
Oregon, would be successful or permanent. In
the summer of 1992, plaintiff met Douglas
Pomeroy, who lives in Corvallis, Oregon, and
plaintiff indicated that she and Mr. Pomeroy
intend to marry.
However, Mr. Pomeroy and
plaintiff have not yet married and there is a
potential for conflict if the family were to
move in with Mr. Pomeroy. Nothing about the
move to Corvallis, Oregon, would enhance the
children's
educational
environment
nor
plaintiff's career potential. It is a high
risk move for plaintiff and the children. (R.
214) .
Marc asserts this finding is supported because there was
uncertainty as to whether Alicia or Mr. Pomeroy would marry. There
was no evidence of such an uncertainty.

There was never a June

1992 wedding date as asserted in the brief of Appellee, page 15.
The wedding date in January 1993 was postponed by Alicia until June
1993 in an effort to accommodate Marc's wishes, allow further
communication between the parties and, specifically, to allow the
children to attend the wedding of Marc's brother in the middle of

June.

(T. 72, 170). No evidence concerning the parties" marriage

plans

indicates

any

potential

for

Alicia's accommodations to Marc.

conflict; it demonstrates

Nor is there any evidence of

potential conflict if the family were to move with Mr. Pomeroy.
Although Mr. Pomeroy has no children, it was the evaluator's
opinion that he was a stable person, sensitive to the children's
needs and their relationship with Marc and that he had a good
relationship with Alicia and the children.
175) .

Mr. Pomeroy

household.

earned

sufficient

(T. 169, 171, 174,

income to

support the

(T. 177, 146). In the evaluator's opinion, Mr. Pomeroy

was a positive factor in the lives of the children (T. 121, 122,
emphasis added) , and a two parent home was definitely in the
children's best interests.

(T. 128, 138).

The only evidence

presented on the educational environment in Corvallis, Oregon,
demonstrated that there were significant advantages to the school
system there because it addressed what Alicia perceived as the
children's specific educational and enrichment needs.

(T. 106-

107) .
Marc is further incorrect in his assessment of the
evidence concerning Alicia's career enhancement if she were to move
to Oregon.

The evidence showed that Corvallis, Oregon, was the

center for her field of artistic glasswork, in which she was
involved prior to the parties' marriage and was attempting to
reenter (T. 69, 168, 198), that artists were able to establish a
career in that field in Oregon, and that there was no such
opportunity available for her in Utah.
6

(T. 69, 168-199, 202-204).

There is no objective evidence to support the Court's finding that
the move to Oregon was risky, would not be successful and permanent
or that it had potential for conflict.

Nor did the evidence

demonstrate that the move lacked advantages to the children's
education or plaintiff's career.
Marc claims contends that the evidence also supports the
Court's finding that, "The children do not wish to Corvallisf
Oregon."

(R. 215).

understandably

This is inaccurate.

became

anxious

about

the

Although the children
relocation

and were

concerned about being separated from their father, as would be
normal, none of them expressed a preference to live with Marc, and
all of the children were accepting of the move.
6 at 16) .

(T. 122, 124, Ex.

There was no evidence that the children desire to be

separated from their mother and live in Summit County, Utah, while
she lived in Corvallis, Oregon.

The custody evaluator clearly

stated that such an arrangement would be extremely disruptive and
contrary to the children's best interests.
The evidence also failed to demonstrate that it would be
in the best interests of the children to remain in Utah if Alicia
were to reside in Corvallis, Oregon, as Marc contends.
found that:
"Although the custody evaluator, Kim Peterson,
recommended the children remain in the
physical custody of plaintiff, he indicated in
his report that it would be in the children's
best interests to remain in Utah and, in
reading his report as a whole, it is clear
that the recommendation was a close call. The
present custodial arrangements have fostered
happy, well-adjusted lives for the children."
(R. 215).
7

The Court

The

custody

evaluator

clearly

and

specifically

recommended that, if Alicia were to move to Corvallis, Oregon, she
should

still

continue

as

the

children's

primary

caretaker.

(Exhibit 6, p. 18). He stated it would be extremely disruptive and
contrary to the children's interests if Alicia were to live in a
separate state from the children (T. 143) , and that it would be
more disruptive to the children for them to be separated from
Alicia than for them to live in a separate state from their father.
(T. 143-144).

No evidence supports the trial court's finding,

which places importance of location of the children above their
relationship with Alicia, their primary caretaker, with whom they
had thrived.

The Court's finding in this regard is so lacking in

evidence so as to be contrary to the clear weight of all evidence
and, therefore, erroneous.
Marc further claims that there is substantial evidence to
support the Court's concerns about Alicia's stability is reflected
in the finding that:
"Although there are no defects in plaintiff's
capacity or willingness to function as a
parent, there is some questions about
plaintiff's stability because of her several
changes of residence during the year since the
entry of the Decree of Divorce herein." (R.
215) .
In so doing, Marc points out that the evidence showed
Alicia had changed her residence since the divorce. Although this
is true, the record fails to indicate any instability on her part
in changing homes; she sold the marital home at Marc's suggestion
because she could not afford to maintain it following the divorce.
8

Her change in residence was beyond her control and deliberated by
her with a focus on meeting the specific needs of her children.
(T. 38, 75-81).

No objective evidence shows otherwise.

Alicia

took the same deliberate approach with regard to her upcoming
marriage to Mr. Pomeroy and the move to Oregon.

She assured that

the children and Mr. Pomeroy had a good relationship, that they
liked where they would be living and that any emotional concerns of
the children were appropriately addressed.
Marc asserts that the Court was correct in its finding
that "Both parents have an equal depth of and long-term desire for
custody. The father has shown a commitment to the children."

(R.

215) . This finding, however, is not supported by the evidence, and
the record as a whole clearly demonstrates it to be erroneous.
Although Marc testified that he had developed his business to a
point where he was able to leave it in the hands of other people,
he had not done so and continued working ten to twelve hour days,
including every Saturday morning.

(T. 29-30). He had historically

kept these work hours and, based on his past employment schedule,
there was no evidence he would not continue to do so.

The child

custody evaluator recognized that Marc's commitment to the children
was far different from the demonstrated commitment Alicia had
historically provided to the children during their entire lives.
The evaluator, Mr. Peterson, viewed Marc's desire for custody to be
one of short duration, concerned more about having frequent contact
with the children than actually wanting custody. He viewed Marc's
Petition to Modify to be more of an attempt to prevent Alicia from
9

moving from Utah than an expression of his desire to undertake the
day-to-day responsibilities of caring for the children.

(Ex. 6 at

p. 17). In fact, Marc's own testimony made it clear that his plan
was to provide surrogate care for the children if they were to live
with him.

(T. 39, 40).
Similarly, the Court's finding that, "...it is unlikely

that, if the children were to move to Corvallis, Oregon, plaintiff
would continue their religious training" is either not supported by
the objective evidence and against the clear weight of evidence or
an impermissible consideration of Alicia's personal religious views
and practices as set forth in Point *

, infra.

Upon her marshalling of the evidence adduced at trial,
Alicia has sufficiently demonstrated that the Court's findings set
forth above are so lacking in support that they are against the
clear weight of the evidence and, therefore, erroneous. Marc has
failed to demonstrate otherwise. The Court's ruling automatically
transferring physical custody of the parties' minor children to
Marc if she relocates from Summit County, Utah, is not supported by
the evidence.

The trial court decision should be reversed to

prevent an injustice from occurring to Alicia and the children.
Point II
MARC HAS FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE THE PROPRIETY
OF THE TRIAL COURT'S CONSIDERATION OF ALICIA'S
RELIGIOUS BELIEFS AND ITS FINDINGS OF FACT
WITH REGARD TO RELIGION IN MAKING ITS CHILD
CUSTODY DETERMINATION.

10

A.
did

not

Marc is incorrect in asserting that the trial court

consider

Alicia's

personal

religious

views

in

its

determinations.
Marc

argues that

the trial

court did

not consider

Alicia's personal views in making its child custody orders, but was
concerned with Alicia's intent to expose the children to different
religions. This assertion is contrary to both the clear record of
the proceedings below and the result of that trial.

It is clear

from Judge Young's statements that the trial court not only
considered Alicia's personal religious views but compared her
religious practices with those of Marc in modifying the child
custody orders of the Decree of Divorce.

At trial, Judge Young

questioned the child custody evaluator as follows:
Judge Young:

There were two other areas that you focused on.
One, you focused on the issue of religion. I think
the Court is not in a position to deal much with
the issue of religion, as you are aware. However,
do you have an opinion — it seems to me to be
relatively obvious if the mother moves to Oregon
that her predisposition about religion, the
children are not going to be involved in religion,
at least the L.D.S. religion in Oregon. Wouldn't
that seem consistent to you?

The Witness:

I do not know that is true that she would disregard
that and not involve them in church. I mean, there
would be a fear that might happen, but I think,
particularly if she is told that she needs to do
that, I suspect that she would. My concern about
the religious thing is just the fact that that's
the way the children have been raised in the past
and a sense that I have that that ought to be
respected and maintained.

Judge Young:

Continued for the children.

Mr. Peterson:

Mm-hmm (yes).

11

Judge Young:

But if the mother has the attitude that she is
going to expose them to other religions and so on.
do you expect that that present religious practice
would be followed?

Mr. Peterson:

I really don't know.

I think that's just real

speculation.
Transcript at 144-145, emphasis added.
Later, when Alicia's counsel attempted to have Alicia
testify on the sort of exposure she wished to give her children to
other religions, Judge Young prevented this evidence from being
presented, stating that the case was not going to turn on religion
and enough evidence had been presented on that issue.

(T. 151).

However, in the trial court's ruling the Court stated:
"The mother, while she testifies that she is
in favor of the children having religious
training consistent with their life, and that
is part of their life, the move to Corvallis
is not compatible with the religious training
that has been provided to the children. The
mother does not intend to attend religious
services. It is not very practical to take 5,
7 and 8 year old children and drop them off,
and she said she would go with them when they
were there.
I think that smacks of the
incredulous. She does not have a commitment
to the religion. And to think that she is
going to go there to foster it causes me to
doubt her credibility. I just don't think she
would do it, and I don't think I would expect
her to do it. So, it is far more compatible
for the children to remain in their religious
environment in which they are present in."
(T. 237-238, emphasis added).
The Court thereafter entered its specific finding of fact
that:
"14. During the marriage, both parents and the
children attended the LDS Church and were
active in the LDS Church.
Since the
separation of the parties, plaintiff has
ceased to be active in the LDS Church.
12

Defendant remains active and wishes to keep
the children active in the LPS Church, The
Court finds that it is unlikely that, if the
children were to move to Corvallis, Oregon,
plaintiff would continue their religious
training." (R. 215, emphasis added).
The

trial

court's

statements

clearly

show that it

considered Alicia's personal religious views and practices in
changing the child custody orders rather than her desire to expose
the children to any other religions.
B.

The record

fails to support the trial court's

finding concerning the children's religious upbringing.
The trial court not only considered Alicia's relative
religiousness in modifying the child custody orders of the Decree
of Divorce, but in so doing specifically found that:
"Defendant remains active and wishes to keep
the children active in the LDS Church. The
Court finds that it is unlikely that, if the
children were to move to Corvallis, Oregon,
plaintiff would continue their religious
training." (R. 215).
This finding is unsupported by the record. The evidence
demonstrated Alicia's active and supportive involvement in the
children's religious upbringing.

There was no evidence of any

break in continuity in the children's religious upbringing since
the parties' divorce while the children were being raised by
Alicia,

and

historical

no

objective

conduct

with

upbringing would change.

evidence

regard

to

indicated
the

that

children's

Alicia's
religious

She is the parent who delivered and

picked the children up from church each Sunday and continued to do
so even on weekends when Marc did not visit with the children. She
13

supported the children and attended each of their religious eventsf
she placed great importance on their religious ideals and planned
to continue with their religious training
children's place of residence.

regardless of the

(T. 35, 148-150).

There was no

evidence that she planned to change the children's religion.

The

fact that Alicia no longer attends the same church service as Marc
and that she wishes to have the children learn about other
religions is not objective evidence which supports the Court's
finding.

Being exposed to different religions is quite different

from being raised

in a different religion or changing one's

religion, and there was no evidence that Alicia had any such plans
to do so.
The evidence and objective evidence presented to the
trial court with regard to the children's religious upbringing was
so insufficient and lacking as to be against the clear weight of
the evidence and, therefore, clearly erroneous.
C.

The trial court's consideration of Alicia's personal

religious beliefs and practices

in determining

child custody

placement is error.
The trial court's consideration of Alicia's religious
beliefs and practices

in determining

child custody placement

constitutes error where there was no religious incompatibility
between Alicia and her children.
There was no objective evidence presented to the trial
court indicating any conflict between the children's religious
concerns and Alicia's personal religious beliefs and practices.
14

She has always supported the children in their religious endeavors
and beliefs, had no plans to discontinue their religious upbringing
or religious affiliation and believed it very important for the
children

to continue

their

involvement

in the LDS religion.

(T. 35, 148-151). Alicia, in great part, assured that the children
attended their church each Sunday by personally taking them to
their service.

(T. 149-150).

Alicia's personal religious belief

and the manner in which she practiced her devotion was not contrary
to the children's religious upbringing, and there was no objective
evidence presented as to any "religious incompatibility" with the
children, making it contrary to their best interests for Alicia to
continue as their primary caretaker.
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized that a court may
consider religious compatibility in determining competing child
custody claims.
1982).

Hutchison v. Hutchison, 649 P.2d 38 at 41 (Utah

Although the courts in Utah have never determined what

constitutes "religious compatibility" or lack thereof, other courts
considering the issue of religion in child custody determinations
hold that any such consideration is proper only where the health or
welfare of the children is at stake.

See e.g. Welker v. Welker.

129 N.W. 2.d 134 (Wis, 1964); Gould v. Gould. 342 N.W. 2.d 426
(Wis. 1984); Wisconsin v. Yoder. 406 U.S. 205, 92 Sup. Ct. 1526 32
L. Ed. 215 (1972), Zummo v. Zummo. 574 A.2d 1130 (Pa. Super 1990).
Whatever

Alicia's

personal

religious

beliefs

and

practices may be, the record does not suggest that they are

15

incompatible with her children's religion or inimical to their
health or welfare.
One of the most important individual rights guaranteed by
both the first amendment of the United States Constitution and the
Constitution

of

Utah

government coercion.

is

that

of

religious

freedom

without

Our court in Utah recently reaffirmed this

freedom in Society of Separationists v. Whitehead, 870 P.2d 916,
935 (Utah 1983), in its analysis of our constitutional guarantees,
observing

that:

"A

general

characterization

of

all

these

provisions, when read together, is that they are designed to
protect religious exercise and freedom of conscience in general...
and to prevent the imposition of civil limitations based on one's
religious beliefs or lack thereof."

Id. at 935.

Marc contends that the trial court did not attempt to
dictate Alicia's religion.

But what the trial court did was

unconstitutionally coercive.

It gave Alicia the unconstitutional

choice

of

following

her

religious

beliefs

and

practices

or

jeopardizing her custodial rights.
The court in Osteraas v. Osteraas, 859 P.2d 948 (Idaho
1993) recognized that the presentation of such a choice is clearly
improper, holding that the denial of custody to a parent because of
certain entertained religious beliefs, or lack thereof, would be
denying that parent a civil right because of such religious
opinions or beliefs. Id. at 953. In underlying Osteraas case, the
trial court found that the parents were equal in almost all
respects, but inappropriately tipped the scales in favor of the
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father and awarded custody to him based upon a consideration of the
mother's religiousness when she desired to relocate with the
parties' minor children.

In Zummo v. Zummo, 574 A.2d 1130 (Pa.

Super 1990), cited in the Brief of Amicus Curiae, the court held
that it was constitutionally

impermissible to decide a child

custody dispute in whole or in part on a consideration of apparent
relative devoutness.

Id. at 1152 (emphasis added).

In taking into consideration Alicia's religious beliefs
or lack thereof and her practice of not attending the religious
services of Marc and the parties' children, the trial court
interfered with Alicia's religious freedom and favored organized
religion over her decision not to participate.

This favoring of

organized religion, as well as interference with Alicia's free
exercise, violates not only the first amendment of the United
States Constitution, but also the Constitution of Utah. Article 1,
Section 4 (1896), and penalizes her for her lack of participation
in an organized religion.
The trial court clearly and inappropriately considered
Alicia's

religious

determinations.

practices

and

beliefs

in

its

custody

The specific findings of the trial court with

regard to her religious practice and the statements of the trial
court make this clear.

The overwhelming evidence and objective

evidence presented at trial fails to support the court's specific
finding

that

it

is unlikely

that Alicia would

children's religious training in Oregon.

continue the

The objective evidence

presented to the trial court demonstrated that Alicia and her
17

children were religiously compatible, with no conflicts with regard
to their religious upbringing.

Accordingly, the court's findings

with regard to religion should be overturned, and the court should
make its own findings of religious compatibility between Alicia and
the children.

The trial court's decision preventing Aliciafs

relocated to the State of Oregon and transferring primary custody
of the children to Marc in the event of that relocation should be
vacated due to the impermissible consideration given to appellant's
religious beliefs and practices in the trial court's ruling.
Point III
ALICIA CLEARLY ESTABLISHED A NEED FOR PAYMENT
OF HER ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS INCURRED IN
DEFENDING DEFENDANT'S PETITION TO MODIFY; SHE
SHOULD BE AWARDED THESE FEES AND COSTS AND
THOSE SHE INCURS ON APPEAL.
Marc claims that Alicia failed to establish a need for
payment of her attorneys' fees because she was entitled to receive
a property settlement from Marc, and because he pays her alimony
and child support.

His assertion fails to recognize that his

payments to Alicia are for the purpose of supporting the household
expenses she incurs for herself and the parties' children where she
has no income, except what she receives from Marc.

(T. 76). This

support award was made as a part of the Decree of Divorce entered
in April 1992 prior to the expenses Alicia incurred for attorneys'
fees and costs in defending this subsequent divorce modification
proceeding.

As a share of her equitable distribution of property

in the prior divorce action, Alicia is entitled to receive a
property settlement from Marc due April 1, 1997.
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However, the

settlement monies were not available to her prior to the time of
trial or the divorce modification proceeding.

Alicia had no

present access to the property settlement at the time of the
divorce modification trial. The household expense needs upon which
her alimony and support payments were based did not include her
attorneys' fees and costs to defendant the divorce modification
proceeding instituted by Marc.
did

not have the ability

There was no assertion that Marc

to pay,

and

the evidence

clearly

demonstrated that he earned approximately $150,000 per year at the
time of trial.

Marc's claim suggests that Alicia should pay her

attorneys' fees by not paying

of her household

expenses or

cannibalizing her share of equitable distribution if and when that
is received.
The evidence was clear that Alicia had a present need for
Marc's contribution towards her attorneys' fees and costs, there is
no evidence that Marc did not have the ability to contribute nor
that the fees and costs claimed were unreasonable.

In considering

these factors, as is required by Morgan v. Morgan. 854 P. 2d 559
(Utah App. 1993), the trial court should have awarded Alicia her
attorneys' fees in defending Marc's Petition to Modify the Decree
of Divorce, and it was abuse of the trial court's discretion in its
failure to do so.

Accordingly, Alicia should be awarded her

reasonable attorneys' fees in this matter and, upon the same basis,
her attorneys' fees on appeal. See Crouse v. Crouse, 817 P.2d 839
(Utah App. 1991).
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Point IV
REGARDLESS
OF
HOW
THE
TRIAL
COURT'S
DETERMINATIONS ARE CHARACTERIZED, IT ABUSED
ITS DISCRETION IN ITS DECISION TRANSFERRING
PHYSICAL CUSTODY OF THE PARTIES' MINOR
CHILDREN TO MARC IN THE EVENT OF ALICIA'S MOVE
TO OREGON.
It is clear that the Court must consider the best
interests of the children and the past conduct and demonstrated
moral standards of the parties in determining whether any change in
circumstance supports a change of the child custody orders of the
parties' Decree of Divorce.

Joraensen v. Joraensen, 599 P.2d 510

(Utah 1979); Utah Code Ann. §30-3-10.3(2)(a). The personal desires
and conduct of the parents is irrelevant to such a consideration
unless it has an impact on the children's best interests. See e.g.
Schindler v.
considering

Schindler.
the

776

factors

P.2d

84

pertaining

(Utah App.
to

the

1989).

In

children's

best

interests, the trial court's choice in competing child custody
claims should be based on function-related factors.
Pusev. 728 P. 2d 117
identity

of

(Utah 1986).

the primary

Pusev v.

These factors include the

caretaker, the

parent

with

greater

flexibility to provide personal care, the identity of the parent
with whom the children has spent most of his or her time pending
the

custody

determination,

provided by each parent.
The

evidence

and

the

stability

of

environment

trial

each

Id. at 118.
presented

at

on

of these

function-related factors clearly shows that the best interests of
the children are served under Alicia's primary care. The children
are happy and well-adjusted under her care, and the trial court so
20

found.

(R. 215). The child custody evaluator recommended that the

children continue living under Alicia's primary care and believed
it would be extremely disruptive for the children to live in a
separate state from their mother.
believed

that

relationship

Marc

with

would
the

be

children

(T. 143-144).

able

to

through

The evaluator

continue
a

more

his

strong

appropriate

visitation schedule with larger blocks of time when he is available
to visit with the children.

(T. 128-129).

The only change of circumstances which in any way would
support a review of the child custody orders in this case is
Alicia's relocation to Oregon. In requiring an automatic transfer
of the physical custody of the children to Marc in the event of
such a move, the trial court inappropriately placed the importance
of the location of the children above the relationship the children
have with either parent and, specifically, their primary caretaker.
Although Marc argues that the trial court weighed the children's
best interests, putting them before either his desires or those of
Alicia, the evidence does not demonstrate that this occurred. The
trial result is not based upon the function-related factors that
are to be considered in making a child custody determination.
The parties anticipated that there might come a time when
either of them would relocate from Park City, Utah, and the Decree
of Divorce specifically provides of notice in such event.

It also

provides that if the parties are not able to reach agreement on any
issue concerning the children's upbringing, then they are first to
attempt

mediation.

(R. 67) .

There has been
21

no change of

circumstances that was not anticipated by the parties at the time
of the Decree of Divorce sufficient to justify a reopening and
revision of the child custody orders or a specific change in the
award of primary physical custody to Alicia or the designation of
the children's primary residence as being with her.

(R. 2) . There

has been no change in the manner in which she has cared for the
children and raised them.

Although a change in the geographical

location of her residence would occur if she were to move with the
children from Summit County, Utah, this alone should not justify a
change in the child custody orders.
In most all instances where a primary caretaker plans to
relocate with the children, the courts allow the children to be
relocated where there is a legitimate reason in the children's best
interests for the custodial parent to move to another state.

See

e.g. Lorenz v. Lorenz, 242.62 788 P.2d 328 (1990); Jaramillo v.
Jaramillo, 823 P.2d 299 (N. Mex. 1991).; Ditto v. Ditto, 628 P.2d
777 (Or. App. 1981); Love v. Love, 851 P.2d 1283 (Wy. 1993).

The

relocations are generally upheld so long as the custodial parent
has good motives for the move. More than mere inconvenience to the
non-custodial parent must be shown to defeat the custodial parent's
right to relocate.

Love v. Love, 851 P.2d 1283 (Wy. 1993).

Love, the court noted that:
It would be incongruous for a court, when
presented with a custodial order originally
based upon the best interests of the child, to
refuse to support the efforts of the custodial
parent to maintain and enhance their standard
of living, albeit in another jurisdiction. So
long as the court is satisfied with the
motives of the custodial parent in seeking the
22

In

move and reasonable visitation is available to
the remaining parent, removal should be
granted. Id. at 1288 (citation omitted).
Similar to the primary physical custodian of the children
in the Love case, Alicia's relocation from Summit County, Utah, is
to enhance the life for herself and her children through a marriage
and opportunities which would generate her an income so she could
become self-sufficient before the termination of Marc's alimony
obligation to her.
City, Utah.

No such opportunities exist for her in Park

No evidence suggests she would not continue to

function as a good parent to her children as she has in the past or
that the children would not continue to be happy and well-nurtured
under her care. Under the circumstances, the trial court was wrong
in providing for an automatic change of primary care of the
children in the event of Alicia's relocation, and abused its
discretion in doing so. The decision of the trial court should be
reversed and Alicia should be granted leave to relocate to Oregon
with the children.
CONCLUSION
The trial court erred and abused

its discretion in

modifying the Decree of Divorce to provide for an automatic change
of physical custody of the children from Alicia to Marc in the
event Alicia relocates from Summit County, Utah.

The findings of

the trail court are inadequate or so lacking in evidence to support
the court's decision that they should not be upheld.

The trial

court's decision providing for an automatic transfer of physical
custody if Alicia moves from Summit County should be reversed to
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correct the significant errors of the trial court in modifying the
Decree of Divorce.

Alicia should be granted leave to move from

Summit County, Utah, with the parties' minor children and continue
in her role as their primary physical custodian, under whom they
have thrived.
Alicia has clearly demonstrated her need for attorneys'
fees and should be awarded all of her attorneys' fees and costs
related to the divorce modification proceeding, as well as those
associated with this appeal, and the matter should be remanded to
the trial court for determination of the same.
DATED this

day of August, 1994.
DART, ADAMSON & DONOVAN
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